In a recent article in this REVIEW, Martin Feldstein (1970) attempted to explain the pricing of physicians' services in the United States between 1948 and 1966.1 In his attempt to measure the demand for physicians' services, Feldstein found a positive price coefficient which led him to conclude that ". . . the aggregate pricing and use of physicians' services can be understood best by assuming that permanent excess demand prevails." 2 Further, since his estimates imply a backward-bending supply curve for physicians' services, he infers ". that government policies to restrain price inflation may increase excess demand but will not decrease and may even increase the quantity of physicians' services provided." 1 We intend to show that (1) the positive price elasticity Feldstein obtains in trying to estimate the demand curve might result from difficulties in defining his price variable (and from the fact that insured and uninsured pay different prices), and (2) his supply estimates are biased because of his use of a dependent variable, inputs (paramedical personnel, equipment, etc.) , as an independent variable in his supply equation.4
I The Demand for Physicians' Services
The Feldstein demand model relates physicians' services per capita to net price (NP),5 the price of other goods, income per capita, and governmental provision of medical services per capita. Using a loglinear form, a positive coefficient is obtained for NP. After splitting NP into its two components, average price (AP) and insurance (Ins), Feldstein found AP to be insignificant while Ins was significant and positive. Feldstein argued that a plausible explanation for his inability to estimate directly the parameters of the demand function was that at observed prices excess demand prevailed.
Since Ins is defined as the ratio of AP to NP, these regressions (D3 and D4, p. 125) are equivalent to using AP and NP (as well as the other variables) as independent variables. The estimated coefficient of AP in this context would be the sum of his estimates for AP and Ins, while the estimated coefficient of NP is the negative of his estimated coefficient for Ins. If we perform this transformation, we find that the coefficient of AP is negative, while that of NP is positive. Therefore, if we interpret AP as the true price variable, then our demand curve has the "proper" slope -whereas if we interpret NP as the price, the demand curve is positively sloped.
It is an open question as to whether Feldstein's AP or NP should be considered the 'true' price variable and this ambiguity stems, in our minds, from the rather strange definitioin of the demand curve. Due to the presence of both uninsured and insured people, the aggregate demand curve really entails aggregating two separate demand curves (for insured and for uninsured), and this aggregation Upon dividing the population into insured (I) and uninsured (N), we see that total demand depends upon the demands of people in each class, as well as the relative strength of these classes. Therefore, as P rises, other things being equal, any given individual within a class (I, N) may buy less physicians' services. However, if the increase in the costs of physicians' services induces more people to become insured and consequently to buy more physicians' services than they did before the price increase, total demand may actually rise. 'It is not clear to us whether Feldstein uses physical inputs or the total costs of these inputs in his supply equation; however, either variable is properly a dependent variable, so that his estimates will be biased.
' Net price is defined as the customary price charged less insurance compensation.
Then the total demand function is:
Now we can talk of a total demand function as dependent upon price as Feldstein does; nevertheless, it is seen that this is a rather curious demand function. Suppose only P changes: uninsured, the aggregate value of k will change (presumably decrease). Therefore, even if P increases, it may be that 'kP' declines. Again, k depends on the income distribution of the uninsured and in turn, the fraction and type of people insured depends on P; hence, k may depend on P. Clearly, therefore, we need more disaggregated data to actually determine the demand curve for the uninsured.
II The Supply of Physicians' Services
As Professor Feldstein correctly asserts, doctors should be treated as utility-maximizing individuals, not profit-maximizing firms. However, he feels that this formulation is not necessarily fruitful, and subsequently postulates that the quantity of physicians' services supplied depends on average fees, price of other goods (CPI), inputs, government services per physician (G/PHYS), and time. Furthermore, since doctors are assumed to desire interesting cases, they are presumed to set prices such that excess demand prevails. Finally, it is assumed that the uninsured pay a fixed fraction of the price charged insured.
Using this framework, Professor Feldstein estimates the supply curve of physicians' services, and finds its price elasticity to be negative. Though we do not reject the possibility of a backward-bending 6 Since k > Z, one would expect the insured to purchase more physicians' services, assuming their income was at least as large as that of the uninsured. ' The mathematical conditions for which {D(NP)/1P} < 0 differ than those for which {DD/DP} > 0.
8 The estimates of the price and income coefficients were opposite to that which economic theory would predict. (e) Finally, it is not clear to us how the excess demand for physicians' services allows the doctors to treat interesting cases. Feldstein seems to assume that doctors pick their patients, accepting some ("interesting ones"), while rejecting others. While this is feasible, it does not really seem compatible with professional ethics ("professional ethics preclude a physician from refusing care to certain cases"-Feldstein, p. 122). Rather, it would seem more plausible that a queue forms, and there seems to be no reason to believe that the "interesting cases" will be nearer the front of the queue. Thus, it is by no means certain that excess demand will in fact provide the doctor with more "interesting cases" ; in fact, if the demand for treatment by "interesting cases" is less elastic than the overall demand for physicians' services and if the queue theory is appropriate, the creation of excess demand by doctors may, in fact, be self-defeating.
Given the above comments, and assuming that doctors maximize their utility, we can derive a supply equation for physicians' services within the context of an equilibrium model. Included as independent variables are P, CPI, nurses' fees (R), GIPHYS, and time." The a priori argument for including G/PHYS as an independent variable is that the fraction of physicians available for private medical care is inversely related to. that variable (see Feldstein, p. 131 cians' services increases as price increases and decreases as (G/PHYS) increases.
III Summary and Conclusions
For many reasons it was difficult to identify the meaning of the Feldstein demand model. Specifically, his price definition generated many problems which disaggregation seemed to clarify, at least for the insured group of the population. In his supply model Feldstein used inputs as an independent variable and found a negatively sloped supply equation. Thus, he argued that if policy makers could lower the price of physicians' services, the quantity of services supplied would increase, ceteris paribus. Using prices and G/PHYS as independent variables, we found a positive sloping supply equation.
Clearly in the context of our model, a decrease in physicians' prices will not increase the quantity of physicians' services, ceteris paribus.
A further result of our model, which is inconsistent with Feldstein's findings, is that by increasing the amount of nurses P declines. As the supply of nurses increases, R will fall, which means (see equation (6)) that physicians' services increase.
Thus, assuming a negatively sloped demand curve, the price of physicians' services will decline.13 In summary, our findings, which are exactly opposite to Feldstein's, lead to different policy statements, and are consistent with standard economic theory.
" This result also holds if the demand curve is positively sloped, assuming the slope of the demand curve exceeds that of the supply curve (so that the market is stable). W. Anderson in 1967 and Feldstein, 1970 . Intervening years were extrapolated. Pk The price paid for physicians' services by the uninsured was proxied by the CPI for physicians' services.
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1 They deal with the special case in which an increase in insurance occurs by a change in the proportion of the population that is insured.
